



EUROPEAN FEDERATION NOW

The problem of the European Federation..... cannot be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault with all available means.

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EUROPEAN FEDERATION NOW

I. — DIVIDED EUROPE

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European civilization, the driving force of which is the quest for freedom, justice and human welfare, is now in mortal danger. For the last 40 years, Europe has been suffering from a sickness ; the effects of it — war, violence, destruction, revolution and tyranny — are sapping away its strength, and there is no sign of recovery. Some of the peoples of Europe are already the victims of drudgery and servitude ; others are still holding out, but their strength is declining and gradually ebbing away.

The fundamental cause of this sickness is the division of Europe into sovereign States. Political, military, economic and social problems are daily becoming so much more unwieldy that they can no longer be solved at the national level. If these problems are to be settled at all, contiguous peoples who have a similar outlook, and who are bound by a common destiny, must unite. The principle of fully sovereign States has prevented any genuine co-operation and, far from bringing unity any closer, has induced keen rivalry and strife, and violent outbursts of oppression. For 10 years between 1914 and 1951, two wars have disrupted the world, and their aftermath has brought with it totalitarian adventure and the preparation of further conflict.

Though still a sound ideal, the unification of Europe as a whole cannot at once be achieved under present conditions ; but for those peoples of Europe who are still free, union is not just a matter of convenience which can be attended to at some time or other ; it is a matter of life and death, of freedom and slavery — and vitally urgent.

In 1945, Hitler's tyranny came to an end. Everywhere, from the Pyrenees to the Vistula, the flags of freedom and democracy were unfurled, and the victors pledged themselves to restore freedom and democracy to Germany also.

When the war ceased, Europe, besides being exhausted economically and helpless, was shaken by violent social disturbances — and it was still crossed with those absurd national frontiers which had already caused its downfall. It was in these circumstances that freedom and independence were soon to receive a further onslaught.

II. — THE U.S.S.R. AND EUROPE

Without any interruption, after Hitler's dream of empire came Stalin's.

The boundary between the countries of Europe occupied by the Soviet Armies and those held by Western Europe has become an insuperable barrier preventing any contact with the peoples on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

In the footsteps of the Red Army, which appeared as the forces of Liberation, came the Secret Police and the Communist Fifth Column. They got hold of the machinery of government and, under the label of "popular democracies", set up Police States — reigns of terror, which resembled the Russian regime in every respect. Every country within the Soviet zone of influence became a Russian satellite, entirely subject to the totalitarian principles, military needs and economic exploitation of the Kremlin. Every attempt to resist oppression was put down with a ruthlessness untempered with the least regard for human beings. Yugoslavia alone has succeeded in swinging out of the Soviet orbit, but it is still essentially a Communist Police State, even though it is heretical in the eyes of Moscow.

But the imperialist ambitions of Communism go well beyond its present frontiers. This totalitarian creed aims at world supremacy. If it is more sharply focussed on Western Europe this is for the following reasons :

FIRST, Communism finds supporters, and has a chance of prevailing, in any country which, through failing to solve the problem of social justice and welfare, is torn by bitter struggles between the wealthy classes and the poor. This weakens the sense of civic solidarity, the only sound basis of democracy, and the way is left open for totalitarian adventure. In some of the main countries of Europe, depressing and disruptive factors of this kind are apparent.

SECONDLY, the industrial complex of Western Europe is second only to that of America. If it should fall into the hands of Russia, that country's inferiority to the United States in industrial power would disappear. Moreover, if the Russians overran the continent, Britain could not easily be defended.

THIRDLY, if Western Europe succeeded in adjusting itself, and—instead of being a responsibility for the United States as it is today—became an effective ally, the strength and prestige of the free world would not only be an insuperable barrier to any subsequent Communist aggression, but a pole of attraction for all the peoples who are now suffering under Communist oppression. For this reason, it is in Russia's interest that strife and disorder should continue in Europe.

These motives explain Soviet policy. In countries such as France and Italy, where Communism has a large following, the Kremlin finances extremely costly party machines, which it requires to be systematically obstructive, both socially and politically.

In other countries, it supports small groups of adepts which eventually become centres of espionage and sabotage. By means of a long and exhausting guerilla war, it tried to conquer Greece. It laid the siege of Berlin, making it necessary for the Allies to use an air-lift for a whole year to bring in supplies—this in order to see how far the United States could commit themselves in Europe. It has stirred up a war in Korea to deflect American attention from Europe. It has provoked German nationalism in order to maintain European discord. It has tried to create another Munich by asking Western Europe and America to agree to the neutrality of Germany—which would have had the two-fold effect of cutting Germany away from the West and giving further scope for the practice of "progressive democracy". Lastly, it has marshalled in Eastern Europe strong military forces ready to be used for aggression if the opportunity should arise, and in any event intended to keep the people of Europe in a constant state of anxiety.

In fact, Communism has all its shafts aimed at Western Europe and is carefully watching for a chance to use them. Since the end of the war, the smaller Western democracies have had no more strength to resist Soviet expansion than the Eastern countries had. If they have not suffered the same fate, it is because Russia has to contend with the power of America.

III. — EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Despite the at times isolationist trends of American public opinion, the United States cannot allow Western Europe, with its huge population and vast economic resources, to fall under Soviet military control—any more than it could let them fall into the hands of German militarism in the past.

That is the main reason why the Americans are in Europe and why they are ready to make heavy sacrifices to resist any attempt to "sovietise" the Continent.

THE AID GIVEN TO EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY

Because of their love of freedom and democracy and their instinctive anti-colonialism, the United States have not used the same methods as the Soviets in their dealings with Europe, and have refrained from making Europe a group of satellite States.

Since 1947, when it became clear that no agreement could be reached with the U.S.S.R. on the future of Europe, the United States have made a determined effort, first in the economic field, then in the military field to help and protect European democracy. They have adopted the idea that a strong and prosperous European democracy is a factor of security not only for Europe, but for America as well, since they are jointly affected by any threat of totalitarianism.

To enable the free peoples to recover the strength without which they would have neither the will nor the inclination to defend their independence, the United States began by organising E.R.P. This organisation, in order to save Europe from hunger, rebuild its devastated cities, and re-equip industry and farming, has imported \$ 11,314,700,000 worth of goods, 76 % of which were in the form of grants.

Faced with the threat of another war, the United States has pledged itself under the Atlantic Pact to defend Europe against aggression from any quarter; they have decided to give the necessary assistance to European rearmement and they have increased the number of military units stationed in Europe.

DANGERS OF THE FAILURE OF THE ASSISTANCE POLICY

This bold and open-handed policy has a good chance of success, and may save Europe and the world from barbarism, provided only that Europe is able to turn the assistance it receives to good account. If Europe failed to make the necessary effort to recover and went on depending indefinitely on the United States for help and protection, the latter, pressed by a disappointed public opinion, would be obliged to make radical changes in their European policy.

To guard against the ever latent risk that Europe might collapse, America would probably be compelled to exercise more and more military and economic control over our countries. The whole burden and responsibility of European defence would have to be shouldered by America. The political and social pattern of the United States would

become quite different: the military authorities would gain power and the civil power would be weakened. The American tradition of freedom might be replaced by the will for power. The countries of Europe would become satellites of an American Empire. In Europe, democratic institutions would soon disappear and they would suffer a grave crisis in America itself.

If the Europeans find this a shocking prospect, so do the Americans, who are justly proud of their free and peaceful way of life. Some of them, considering that E.R.P. has not yielded as much as was expected, and being afraid of the effects that permanent defence effort might have on their country, would like it to withdraw its commitments and resume an isolationist policy. Others, who are aware that America is now stronger than the U.S.S.R., and afraid that the relative strength of each country may not always be the same, are attracted by the idea of a preventive war.

Nonetheless, responsible American statementen are fully aware of the disastrous consequences that a return to isolationism or the outbreak of a third World War would imply. They still maintain that European democracy must be given assistance in order that it may eventually become a powerful and reliable ally, capable of containing Soviet Imperialism and safeguarding Peace.

ASSISTANCE TO EUROPEAN STATES OR ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE ?

The Americans themselves believe that the weakness of Europe is due to out-dated political and economic nationalism, which paralyses any effective co-operation, far more than to the damage caused during the war.

Even at the time when General Marshall submitted the plan that bears his name, he stressed the need for the unification of Europe, and the E.C.A. authorities have on several occasions emphasized how necessary it is to step out holdly on the road to European unity.

Until a short while ago, however, most people in the United States believed that the problem of European unity was a matter for Europeans alone. As long as the latter showed that they did not want it, America was convinced that she must accept the sovereignty of each State as a *de facto* situation. It was very widely believed that the countries of Europe would recover with American aid and that, in this way, they would one day be able to co-operate effectively in joint defence.

This illusion was shattered by events. The European economies have continued to need American aid; the military

effort is still unadjusted to the most elementary defence requirements and many European organisations (O.E.E.C., Brussels Pact, Council of Europe, Committee and Political and Technical Council of the Atlantic Pact) have been unable to achieve genuine co-operation.

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S WARNING

The supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of NATO — the organisation which has been entrusted with the heavy task of giving material substance to the alliance between America and Europe, and organising their defence — has realised more clearly than any other American or European Statesman how illusive were the attempts to save Europe without uniting it effectively.

On 3rd July 1951, speaking in London, General Eisenhower said :

" The member nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization need not fear the future or any communistic threat if we are alert, realistic and resolute. Our community possesses a potential might that far surpasses the sinister forces of slave camp and chained millions. But to achieve the serenity and the confidence that our potential can provide, we must press forward with the mobilization of our spiritual and intellectual strength, we must develop promptly the American force that will assure the safety of our friends upon the continent and the security of the free world.

" This is the challenge of our times, that until satisfactorily met, establishes priorities in all our thoughts, our work, our sacrifices. The hand of the aggressor is stayed by strength — and strength alone.

" Although the security of each of us is bound up in the safety of all of us, the immediate threat is most keenly felt by our partners in Europe. Half the continent is already within the monolithic mass of totalitarianism. The drawn and haunted faces in the docks of the purge courts are grim evidence of what communistic domination means. It is clearly necessary that we quickly develop maximum strength within free Europe itself. Our interests demand it.

" It is a truism that where, among partners, strength is demanded in its fullness, unity is the first requisite. Without unity, the effort becomes less powerful in application, less decisive in result. This fact has special application in Europe. It would be difficult indeed to overstate the benefits, in these years of stress and tension that would accrue to NATO if the free nations of Europe were truly a unit.

" But in that vital region, history, custom, language and prejudice have combined to hamper integration. Progress has been and is hobbled by a web of customs barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral cartels, local shortages, and economic monstrosities. How tragic! Free men facing the spector of political bondage, are crippled by artificial bonds that they themselves have forged, and they alone can loosen! Here is a task to challenge the efforts of the wisest statesmen, the best economists, the most brilliant diplomats.

" The difficulties of integrating Western Europe, of course, appear staggering to those who live by ritual. But great majorities in Europe earnestly want liberty, peace and the opportunity to pass on to their children the fair lands and the culture of Western Europe. They deserve, at the very least, a fair chance to work together for the common purpose, freed of the costly encumbrances they are now compelled to carry.

" Europe cannot attain the towering material stature possible to its peoples' skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial fences. They foster localized instead of common interest. They pyramid every cost, with middlemen, tariffs, taxes, and overheads. Barred absolutely are the efficient division of labor and resources and the easy flow of trade. In the political field, these barriers promote distrust and suspicion, they serve vested interests at the expense of peoples and prevent truly concerted action for Europe's own and obvious good.

" This is not to say that, as a commander, I have found anything but ready cooperation among the governments of Western Europe. Time and again, I have saluted from my heart the spirit of their armed services — of officers and men alike — from the mountains of Italy to the fjords of Norway, from Normandy to the Curtain. Within political circles, I have found statesmen eager to assure the success of their current defense programs. I have no doubts as to the capacity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to surmount even the formidable obstacles imposed upon us by the political facts of present day Europe.

" Yet, with the handicaps of enforced division, it is clear that even the minimum essential security effort will seriously strain the resources of Europe. We ignore this danger at our peril since the effects of economic failure would be disastrous upon spiritual and material strength alike. True security never rests upon the shoulders of men denied a decent present and the hope of a better future.

" But with unity achieved, Europe could build adequate security and, at the same time, continue the march of human

"betterment that has characterized Western civilization. Once
 "united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, the
 "foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland,
 "Denmark, the skilled labor of Italy, will produce miracles
 "for the common good.

"In such unity is a secure future for these peoples. It
 "would mean early independence of aid from America and other
 "Atlantic countries. The coffers, mines and factories of that
 "continent are not inexhaustible. Dependence upon them must
 "be minimized by the maximum cooperative effort. The establish-
 "ment of a workable European federation would go far to
 "create confidence among people everywhere that Europe was
 "doing its full and vital share in giving this cooperation.

"Any soldier contemplating this problem would be moved
 "to express an opinion that it cannot be attacked successfully
 "by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault,
 "with all available means.

"The project faces the deadly danger of procrastination,
 "timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages. Granted that
 "the bars of tradition and habit are numerous and stout, the
 "greatest bars to this, as any human enterprise, lie in the minds
 "of men themselves. The negative is always the easy side, since
 "it holds that nothing should be done.

"The negative is happy in lethargy, contemplating
 "almost with complacent satisfaction, the difficulties of the other
 "course. But difficulties are often of such slight substance that
 "they fade into nothing at the first sign of success. If obstacles
 "are of greater consequence, they can always be overcome when
 "they must be overcome. And which of these obstacles could
 "be so important as peace, security, and prosperity for Europe's
 "populations?

"Could we not help? We, the peoples of the British
 "Commonwealth and of the United States, have profited by
 "unity at home. If, with our moral and material assistance,
 "the free European nations could attain a similar integration,
 "our friends would be strengthened, our own economics im-
 "proved, and the laborious NATO machinery of mutual
 "defense vastly simplified.

"A solid, healthy, confident Europe would be the greatest
 "possible boon to the functioning and objectives of the Atlantic
 "Pact."

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 This speech was not simply intended to suit the
 occasion. A few weeks later, he pleaded the same cause before
 an American Congress Committee when he declared:

"I confidently expect that many of our problems would
 "vanish if the whole of Western Europe were merged into a single

"federal union. I am so convinced of this that, in my view,
 "neither the United States, the British Commonwealth, nor
 "any other country will enjoy true security until such a union
 "is achieved."

These words were addressed to General Eisenhower's
 fellow countrymen; he was showing them how necessary it
 was to give resolute support to the policy of European
 Federal Union. He was also speaking to the British; though
 aware of their distrust of any suggestion that their country
 should be part of a Continental Federation, he was allowing
 for this attitude and appealing to the peoples of the
 Commonwealth to help the free nations of Europe to unite.

But above all, he meant to make himself heard by
 Europeans on the Continent to show how absurd their
 situation was, and at the same time point out what their sole
 aim should be.

IV. — THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC EUROPE

After four years of American aid, a large part of which
 was in the form of grants, Western Europe can still be
 compared to a very sick man who is only kept alive by
 constant doses of oxygen and shows no sign of early recovery.

There is, however, one exception. Britain has also been
 in need of American aid, but she has tried to use it to best
 advantage, and this she was able to do because of historical
 circumstances which did not apply in the rest of Europe.
 The British people emerged from the war with pride at
 having stood a fearful test, and that is why they have kept
 their moral strength and a legitimate faith in the national
 character. The machinery of government is still intact, efficient
 and respected. Britain is both the political centre of that
 wide community of friendly peoples — the Commonwealth,
 and the economic and financial centre of the huge market
 which the sterling area represents.

In these circumstances, Britain was able to tackle suc-
 cessfully both economic reconstruction and social reform and
 to prepare her defences against Soviet Imperialism. Though
 less powerful than the United States, Britain within the
 framework of the Atlantic Pact is a factor to be reckoned
 with. She is able to treat with America on equal terms, sure
 in the knowledge that her contribution to the alliance is
 a weighty one, and that her voice will not be unheeded.

However, the recovery of Britain does not mean the
 recovery of Europe. The political, economic and social
 situation of all the democratic countries of Western Europe,
 that is to say, those which are most directly threatened, is

very different from that of Britain. Notwithstanding American aid, the subdivision of Europe into sovereign states has made it impossible to solve the problem of their internal and external security. To realize how serious the position is, it will suffice to review the urgent issues which remain unsolved.

THE RETROGRADE CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES

Thanks to E.R.P. aid, the various countries of the European continent were able to recover from the state of paralysis with which they were afflicted at the end of the war. Though they were able to set their economies in motion once more, each country retained its own currency and its own foreign trade policy. In spite of the efforts of the O.E.E.C. and the E.U.P. and the results they achieved, this nullified any attempt at closer co-operation or at more highly developed economic integration.

To all intents and purposes, each country has rebuilt the national economic system it had before the war rather than contributed to the establishment of a new European economic system. National markets are still small and have practically no communication among themselves. Each country has gone on producing of its own accord, at higher cost, goods which it would have been more sensible to procure elsewhere, and has been unable to devote itself to the manufacture of commodities for which there was a ready export market. The division of labour and mass production which are the secret of high productivity, were frustrated by customs barriers, and the standard of living consequently remains very low.

Group and monopoly interests within the national markets themselves, sheltered as they were from any foreign competition, held and strengthened their privileges, and thus helped to impoverish and disorganise their own economic systems.

As long as economic protectionism — the inevitable result of political boundaries — remains in Europe, there will be no possibility of coming out of the depression and of raising to any extent the standard of living of the poorer classes. An improvement of this sort is essential to the health of any democratic regime, and as a result of this, the standards of living of the various classes of Society will remain in sharp contrast. Low productivity and social inequality will continue to make it impossible to allocate, for the organisation of defence, resources equal to the danger which threatens Europe.

WEAKNESS OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

The machinery of Government which the democratic countries of continental Europe have at their disposal was badly battered by the war. It is inefficient and seldom respected by the average citizen. With instruments of this kind, the European Governments are unable to impose with proper fairness and resolution, the restrictions that rearmament would require. Inflation is practically the only means they have of transferring wealth as required and this method always activates the process of social disintegration.

For this reason, the European Governments are obliged in their economic and tax policies, to confine themselves to half measures which are neither equal to what social justice demands, nor adequate to the requirements of military defence. It is no wonder then, that what little authority they still possess in the eyes of their subjects tends to become even weaker.

LACK OF CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR COUNTRY'S POWERS OF RESISTANCE

In addition to the fact that unhealthy economies and weak governments are unable to yield any genuine military effort, it is necessary to bear in mind the widespread opinion that national territories can no longer be defended if this task is entrusted to the small armies of national states. The continental peoples who took part in the second World War — whether French or German, Italian or Dutch — all witnessed the total collapse of their countries. How can one believe that one's own army will be able to resist an attack more powerful even than in the past, when the country is even weaker now than it was then?

It is in this way that resignation and a helpless attitude in the face of danger gain more ground.

THE CASE OF GERMANY

Despite the obvious need for the union of all forces against the threat of aggression, the permanent sub-division of Europe breeds mutual distrust and prevents any agreement. The case of Germany is a particularly striking instance.

The defence of Europe is inconceivable without the help of Germany's human and material resources, but the rebirth of a national German army — the only way in which Germany could share in the defence of Europe as long as the sovereignty of national government is maintained — stirs up suspicion in every country in Europe, and anxiety in Germany itself.

Germany is in fact exposed to aggression from the East more than any other country and as soon as the German Government had its own national army, it would inevitably have to choose between two equally dangerous courses: either come to an agreement with the U.S.S.R. in order to placate that country — and so break away from the Western democracies — or else be armed to the teeth; in which case the Generals would again come to the fore, and once more stifle democracy at birth.

In either case, there can be no doubt that from the time when another German national army is set up, the solidarity of the democratic peoples of Europe will receive a fatal blow, and that it will be the occasion for the worst kind of rivalry.

Among all the inconsistencies of Europe today, the fact that European democracy can accept neither an armed Germany nor a disarmed one makes the absurdity of maintaining the system of national sovereignty plainly obvious.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH AMERICA

The patchwork pattern of Europe prevents any loyal and genuine agreement between the European countries and America. Solidarity with, and praise for, the United States, is a common theme in Europe; the need for American aid is still keenly felt, and, as sometimes occurs in such cases, praise is mixed with resentment against the donor.

The European countries are too weak for their voices to sway Atlantic policy. They are constantly inhibited with the painful and humiliating idea of being involved in something they did not ask for.

General Staffs of national armies still think in terms of national defence, and are afraid to commit themselves to an Atlantic strategy which might mean sacrificing their own country.

The Atlantic Council has asked the European Governments to contribute to common defence by no longer having composite armies in which every army is represented, and by agreeing to specialize in a specific arm so that the Atlantic forces taken as a whole may be more efficient. Though the European countries ostensibly agree with this principle of "balanced" forces, they deeply resent at heart the idea of making their armed forces so specialized as to be useless for the support of their own foreign policy.

Hence, though aware of the highly dangerous game they are playing, the European Governments are still making

promises and not keeping them. The numerous committees of NATO hold more and more meetings and draw up more and more programmes without passing any effective resolutions because of the passive resistance of European Governments.

Instead of leading to friendship and understanding, the Atlantic Pact may thus well become a lasting source of distrust and resentment between Americans and Europeans.

THE MORAL BREAKDOWN OF EUROPE

These comments explain why in every country of continental Europe, an ever increasing number of people are losing all faith in the future of their own country and of free institutions. In addition to the steady decline of political institutions, economic systems and military forces, there is a gradual loss of civic sense.

NEUTRALISM. — The first sign of the decay is "neutrality". Neutralists more or less openly disapprove the pact which America has made with the countries of Europe, and would like the latter to withdraw their commitments whenever possible. In their view, the countries of Europe should keep on good terms with both giants without part in their antagonisms; should the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. come to armed conflict, they should remain aloof as spectators.

Neutrality is morally reprehensible because in spite of the combination of political circumstances which has brought totalitarian countries like Spain and Yugoslavia closer to the democratic camp, the contrast between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is now essentially the contrast between freedom and slavery. No country confronted with this alternative can remain neutral.

Even if one wanted to ignore this aspect of the problem, neutrality is inherently absurd since the countries of Western Europe are themselves the main issue at stake, and since the threat will still remain even if they do declare themselves neutral. The fact that Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark were neutrals did not save them when they were attacked by William II and Hitler.

By going carefully into what neutralists really think, it would be found that they have no hope of keeping out of conflict. Overwhelmed by the certainty that their country cannot be defended, they have lost hope. In their view, therefore, there can be no point in entering into commitments and making sacrifices since the goal is unattainable; and in these circumstances, it is better to resign oneself and be ready to welcome whoever the victor may be as this may move him to compassion.

COMMUNISM OR SOVIET "SATELLITISM". — Many people have ended by aspiring to the bonds of communist rule — they have been enthralled by the melancholy creed which promises to every man full equality under an almighty overlord, a tyrant who casts all the parts and has power of life and death over every one.

Wherever there is welfare, security, and a genuine willingness to achieve a wider measure of social justice, Communism cannot flourish. But in an atmosphere of social decay and political decrepitude such as prevails in Europe, the myth of the Kremlin attracts not only those who have lost all sense of security and are frantically searching for a leader to save them, but those who are attracted by the servility of the masses, and who long to exert — be it indirectly — absolute power over their fellow men.

NEO-FASCISM. — It was unbridled nationalism which brought about Europe's downfall. Nevertheless, national states still continue to exercise sovereign power and the democratic countries cannot succeed in putting things in order. Consequently, the idea is once more gaining ground everywhere that political and social strife should be put down by raising the old nationalist idol for the people to worship. It is hoped that in this way, the wretched European States would be braced up a little. Neo-Fascism is anti-American out of bitterness, and anti-Russian out of fear. It is alien and hostile to freedom and totalitarian equality alike. It comes as a ghost from the past to compel the country, under police oppression, to show enough internal discipline to play the sorry part of selling itself to the highest bidder; by such methods, it hopes to promote its mad ambitions of national grandeur.

AMERICAN "SATELLITISM". — Some people would like to see America's policy of aid to Europe changed in to one of domination over Europe. They very ostensibly profess to be friends of America but in point of fact, they want to become its servants. If they are prepared to forsake their freedom it is in order to have a powerful — and rich — protector who will hand out gifts and favours. The adepts of American "satellitism" are numerous, especially among those who enjoy a privileged position in their own country and who hope to keep their privileges — whether political or economic — as a reward for the support they give to the new Empire. If they do not say this openly, it is because they know that the vast majority of Americans would simply loathe such a prospect. It does, however, show how low Europe has fallen when one finds many Europeans ready to

approve a policy which so few Americans are prepared to practise.

On the European continent the structure of democracy still remains, but the sub-division of Europe into sovereign States frustrates any kind of bold enterprise.

The four trends of opinion we have just described are gradually undermining the democracies and will bring about their ultimate collapse. That is, in fact, what the Kremlin expects, since its power and ambitions are based on the decay of the Free World.

V. — THE WAY OUT : EUROPEAN FEDERATION

The appeal made by General Eisenhower endorses the long standing petition of Federalists in every part of Europe. If European decadence is to be checked, the system of sovereign States must be definitely abandoned and the European peoples must become united in a Federation.

European Federation must be an open house, ready to welcome any country when it chooses the path of freedom. But the people who are already free must build it at once, and if some of them, such as Britain and the Scandinavian countries, are still unconvinced and waiting to see the others in action, then the latter must begin now. They are in fact more gravely affected by the break-down of the old system and more directly threatened by the risk of totalitarianism.

It is up to France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to join together in a Continental Federation which will be the corner-stone of the United States of Europe. That was the path clearly traced by the Three Power Declaration on 14th September 1951.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CAPACITY

Aware as they are of their weakness, and hoping to receive foreign aid, these six countries are unable to defend themselves; but this is simply because they are broken up into separate States.

Their total production capacity, though kept down and hampered by their present frontiers, is now half-way between that of the United States and that of the U.S.S.R. The following figures are sufficient proof of this :

ANNUAL PRODUCTION 1950		FRANCE GERMANY ITALY BENELUX	U. S. A.	U. R. S. S.
COAL.....	'000 m. t.	217,283	504,756	268,300
	% of world total	14 %	33 %	17 %
STEEL.....	'000 m. t.	31,716	87,720	27,300
	% of world total	17 %	47 %	15 %
ELECTRI- CITY.	Million KWh	115,188	328,992	90,000
	% of world total	12 %	35 %	10 %
MOTOR VEHICLES.	'000 Units	687	8,003	500
	% of world total	7 %	76 %	5 %

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION

It is easy to imagine how much these figures would rise if these six countries, having once beaten down the barriers within which they are confined, gradually formed a single market with a single currency and a proper division of labour, and so achieved a production capacity hitherto unknown in Europe. American prosperity is not due to any exceptional gift of nature but to the size of the market which has stimulated the Americans to expand their production as much as they could.

There is no natural obstacle to prevent Europe from attaining a similar degree of productivity — only political barriers which man has built and which man can undo.

By comparing some of the figures concerning the standard of living in the United States and in a few countries of Western Europe it is easy to see how much better it is for the workers to be part of a large unified economic system rather than a non-integrated national economy.

WORKING TIME REQUIRED TO EARN CONSUMER GOODS FOR THE AVERAGE INDUSTRIAL WORKER (2nd HALF 1950)

	BREAD 1 kg	STEAK 1 kg	MAN'S SUIT (wool)
U.S.A.....	0 h. 13'	1 h. 29'	33 h. 13'
FRANCE.....	0 h. 19'	4 h. 58'	86 h. 44'
GERMANY.....	0 h. 26'	6 h. 23'	90 h. 19'
ITALY.....	0 h. 49'	10 h. 25'	208 h. 20'

The wealth which the economic unification of Europe must necessarily produce would not only bring about a real stability and improvement in the standard of living of the peoples of Europe but would facilitate social reform by helping to raise the relative standard of living of the poorer classes.

MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION

With an economic capacity which is already that of a major world power — and which unification would strengthen even more — the six federated countries would have a population of 155 million inhabitants, that is to say somewhat less than the 203 million of the U.S.S.R., and rather more than the 150 million of the United States. The armed forces that would be available to the European Continental Federation would be such that Europeans would lose their inferiority complex. The Soviet rulers would no longer be open to the temptation of a military walk-over to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; American statesmen would no longer be subject to the pressure of a public opinion which is exasperated by the instability of foreign politics and by the feeling that the fiscal charges it is bearing serve no useful purpose. The

very existence of the European Federation's armed forces would make for better stability and hence be a factor of world peace.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION

To begin with, the Federal Unification of Europe would put an end to mutual distrust between the federated peoples, especially the Germans and the French. The unification of markets would give so great an impulse to production that a genuine rearmament effort could be made as well as a good deal of social progress.

The citizens of the European Federation would soon recover faith in their future, in their new fatherland and in their democratic institutions. The attraction of Communist and Fascist totalitarian doctrines would soon decline.

All these weaknesses, which now make these six countries dependent upon American aid, would disappear in a Federated Europe. The Atlantic Pact would at last become what it ought to be, an agreement for the common defence of peace and freedom, between three powers equally strong, independent and resolved to do their duty: the United States, the British Commonwealth and the European Federation.

VI. — HOW TO ACHIEVE EUROPEAN FEDERATION

Difficulties of domestic policy and outside pressure have for several years compelled statesmen to tackle the problem of European unification.

Several attempts have been made in this direction and various projects are either being prepared or about to be approved. If none of these efforts has yet solved the problem, they have, at any rate, succeeded in bringing the facts of it before European opinion.

COUNCILS OF SOVEREIGN STATES

The procedure frequently adopted by European statesmen since 1947 is what may conveniently be described as the system of Leagues and Councils of Sovereign States. Throughout history, whenever a number of States intent upon keeping their sovereignty have formed a Union, they have always made use of institutions similar to the O.E.E.C., Western Union (Brussels Treaty), Benelux, the Franco-Italian Customs Union and the Council of Europe.

From the Confederations of Greek City States to the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons and that of the seven Provinces of the Low Countries up to and including the American Confederation of 1781, the same procedure has been repeated again and again, and in each case it has failed.

Once the need for a Union has been solemnly proclaimed, one or more Committees, Councils or Conferences of Delegates from the sovereign States are established. The duties of the Council are defined and it is instructed to make decisions in the name of the League as a whole.

Each State regards itself as being bound only by such decisions as are ratified by its own constitutional authorities and jealously keeps for itself the power to act upon the decisions of the Council. The Council's decisions must be subject to a unanimous vote, or to its equivalent, the right of veto, since any State can refuse to carry out a given decision and since there is no legal means of compelling it to do so if it will not yield. Throughout history, no example can be found of a Confederation or League of Sovereign States which did not give a sorry exhibition of discord and impotence.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE AMERICAN CONFEDERATION

It is interesting to recall that before the United States gave themselves a Federal Government, they formed a Confederation. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress, that is to say the Council of Representatives from each State, was given wide powers: the right to make peace and war, to build a Navy, to control diplomatic relations, to mint coins, to settle frontier disputes between States, to issue loans, and to decide upon the expenditure that working of the Federation would require. But under the Constitution, the Confederation was only a "League of Sovereign States". Congress could make decisions but had no machinery to carry them into effect, consequently, they were nothing more than recommendations. The States acted upon them only in so far as they were willing to do so. Hence, the Confederation was unable to exercise any of the powers which had been assigned to it.

The situation of the American Confederation was described in 1786 by the English economist, Josiah Tucker, who was particularly well informed of American affairs.

"As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one head, whether republic or monarchical, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that ever was

conceived even by writers of romance. The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their differences of governments, habitudes, and manners, indicate that they will have no centre of union and no common interest. They never can be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever, a disunited people till the end of time, suspicious and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and sub-divided into little commonwealths or principalities, according to natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea, and by vast rivers, lakes, and ridges of mountains."

These words were written a year before the American Federation was founded. Though the forecast was thus proved entirely false, it did in fact exactly describe the state of affairs which existed at the time. The Confederation fostered differences and made them look as if they were inevitable and irreconcilable, whereas they were simply due to the chaotic system then applied.

It is small wonder then, that European democracy shows a similar picture today. After much laborious discussion, various Committees and Councils come to decisions which are more or less important. These decisions are in fact mere recommendations to Member States, and the latter occasionally agree to carry them partly into effect. The "Committees" then come to the bitter conclusion that divergencies have widened meanwhile; then they make more recommendations which are treated in the same way.

The position in Europe is different from that of America in the 18th Century. In six years the Americans were content with the establishment of a single Council of Sovereign States, which they called congress, and when they found that it could do nothing, they decided to establish a Federation. The Europeans, on the other hand, have established five or six Councils in less than four years, have made plans for four or five others, and are scarcely beginning to see that all this is of no use.

The real value of these Councils and committees has been to reveal the limits and inefficiency of certain methods and consequently to throw into relief those which would enable the goal to be reached.

THE SCHUMAN PLAN — A SOUND SCHEME ON TOO SMALL A SCALE

The Draft Treaty for the constitution of a Coal and Steel Pool is now being submitted for ratification to the Parliaments of the six European countries concerned. Already, the French and Netherlands Parliaments have ratified it.

The Pool is to be controlled by a governing body known as the "High Authority", which will be empowered

to make decisions and give them practical effect without reference to individual Governments. Producers will pay taxes to it direct, which means that it will not be financially dependent upon the Associated States. Its objects are as follows: to remove Customs barriers and quotas for coal and steel within the area of the Pool; to ensure that the market is competitive and that no Cartels will be formed; to guarantee that all persons within the Pool shall have access to these raw materials on equal terms and that no discrimination will be made on grounds of nationality.

There can be no doubt that the Schuman Plan is of exceptional importance in present-day European politics.

It makes it clear that, as a practical issue, the limitation of sovereignty can only be tackled by the democracies of Continental Europe proper. At present, Britain is willing to join any inter-governmental advisory body, but will not cede any sovereign rights to a European authority.

Apart from this, the Plan provides for an actual transfer of sovereign rights relating to Customs and Anti-Trust laws for iron and steel. Lastly, it has proved to European statesmen that sovereignty is not an indivisible whole, since it can be partially ceded to a joint authority, and they are thus taking interest in an idea which was formerly regarded as the hopeless dream of Federalist enthusiasts.

However, the chief merit of the Schuman Plan — strange as this may seem — is not what it sets out to do, but the surrounding issues it has raised. The authors of the Plan have come to realise that if it is to work efficiently it must be embodied in a scheme for European unity of much wider scope.

As raw materials, coal and steel are of capital importance in peace and war. No government can truly abandon all control over these two commodities unless it forgoes some of its sovereign rights in the fields of foreign and economic policy, and in the organisation of defence. Either unity will be achieved in these fields, or the coal and steel Pool will be still-born.

The purpose of the French Government's proposal was to put an end to the long-standing rivalry between French and German heavy industry — a feud which had hampered relations between these two great countries for too long. It is not without good reason that, instead of waiting for the ratification of the Schuman Plan, the French Government has decided to press on and propose that the unification of the armed forces of Europe should be discussed.

THE EUROPEAN ARMY OR EUROPE AT THE CROSS-ROADS

There can be no doubt that in the present circumstances, the creation of a European Army must be the principal aim if Europe is to be defended.

The existence of national armies and the disarmament enforced upon Germany are obvious proof of the persistent weakness and discord which prevails in Europe. To strive for a European Army is to strive for a strong, free and united Europe. The representatives of the European continental countries who met to discuss the unification of Europe's armed forces had barely tackled the problem before they were convinced that armed forces are not a mere attribute of sovereignty but its essential basis. The organisation of the Army in peace and war, so intimately affects every aspect of national activity that military unification is inconceivable without the establishment of a European Federal Government, for the following reasons :

1° ARMED FORCES AND FOREIGN POLICY are two inseparable aspects of national sovereignty. Every country's foreign relations—even in peace-time—depend in the last resort on its military strength ; conversely, the size of its forces, and their armament, composition, geographical distribution and training are dependent upon the country's foreign policy. There can be no military unification in Europe unless foreign policy is unified at the same time.

2° ARMED FORCES AND TAXATION POLICY are also inseparable aspects of national sovereignty. There can be no possibility of organising, maintaining, and using an army without having the power to raise taxes. A European Army involves European taxes and a European Budget. There will be no European Army if the exclusive right to levy taxes is left to individual Governments on the understanding that they will contribute to a Joint Fund. Having no further control over the Army and, hence, being unable to see the European military situation in its broader aspect, each National Parliament will inevitably be tempted to reduce its contribution and to pay it grudgingly. Throughout history, whenever several countries have tried to form a common army by contributing to a joint fund, the scheme has failed because the contributions were never paid.

A European Defence Budget means that there must be a European Parliament whose members will represent all the citizens of Europe and decide upon the taxes to be raised from them direct.

3° ARMED FORCES AND ECONOMIC POLICY are also interdependent. The equipment of the army on which a

country relies for its defence must depend on the state of the national economy. The economic development of each European country having been adjusted to suit its foreign and defence policies, these countries have reached such a stage of mutual independence as to be no longer capable of a joint economic effort on a scale large enough to meet European defence needs. This effort cannot be made as long as economic policy is a prerogative of national sovereignty, or with a system involving numerous currencies and Customs barriers. A European Army based on present national economics must inevitably have a serious congenital weakness.

4° LASTLY, A EUROPEAN ARMY CANNOT BE CONCEIVED WITHOUT MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EUROPEANS. — By the unscrupulous use of propaganda and by terrorism a Totalitarian Police State can compel its soldiers to fight, even if they hate their rulers. In democratic states, on the other hand, men will only fight with a good heart if they are sure that there is confidence and unity within the community their uniform symbolises, and if they feel that they are defending a society which is capable of securing welfare, freedom and peace for its members.

How can European soldiers be expected to be ready to die for Europe if it is divided, and just a hearth of intrigue ? Unless a European democratic government is set up for the purpose of securing welfare and justice in Europe, the raising of an army will be pointless. Affected as they still will be by defeatist propaganda, whether " neutralist " or " fascist ", its men will make poor soldiers.

From whatever angle one considers the problem of European Federation, the conclusion is always the same : Without a common army there can be no salvation for Europe, and without a Federal Government there can be no European Army.

A Federation respects national idiosyncracies. The Federated States are left full jurisdiction in all matters outside the purview of the Federal Government, but federal institutions must be set up to deal with foreign, defence and economic policies. To be in favour of a European Army means to be in favour of Federal Government.

THE PROCEDURE TO ADOPT

In General Eisenhower's own phrase, the worst risk confronting Europe today is "*the deadly danger of procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages.*"

The Conference on the European Army represents the utmost limit of what can be achieved by " half-measures ".

If the whole process is not to be a complete fiasco, then the time has come to set about the task boldly and lay the foundations of the European Government.

Partial issues like the coal and steel Pool and the Common Army cannot be solved unless the central political authorities of the European Community are set up. But Governments which are in favour of a genuine union cannot achieve this aim without discussing a draft Pact of Federal Union defining clearly the joint institutions to be established, the powers to be transferred to them, and the relations between the Federated States and the new Federal Government.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION

The method adopted by the thirteen States when the United States of America were established shows how sovereign States can be united in a Federation without resorting to force or compulsion.

In order to adjust their differences—which the apparent unity of the Confederation concealed—the thirteen agreed in 1787 to call a Federal Convention at Philadelphia. Its terms of reference were not to draw up simply another Treaty, but a Federal Constitution. The Convention—consisting of the representatives of the thirteen parliaments—succeeded in a few months in defining the Federal institutions and the powers which were to be irrevocably transferred to them. The Draft Constitution was then submitted to each State for ratification and as soon as it had been so ratified by the requisite number of States, it came into effect and the Federal institutions stipulated in it were established. Even the States which had originally refused to come into the Federation were soon convinced of its advantages and subsequently joined it. The United States of America are still governed by the Constitution of 1787, which began the process of political and economic development which has brought that country to its present level of power and prosperity.

It is now for Europe to take the same course.

THE FIRST STAGE — A TREATY FOR THE CONVENING OF A EUROPEAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

In order to make the procedure quite clear, a brief description is given below of the various steps to be taken to ensure, without any loss of continuity, the transfer of power from Sovereign States to a Federal Government.

The first step to be taken—at the instance of one or more governments—is to draft a Treaty for the convening

of a European Federal Constituent Assembly whose terms of reference will be to draft a Pact of Federal Union.

Such a measure would not be incompatible with the coal and steel Pool, nor with the Conference for the Unification of European Armed Forces. A Constituent Assembly would be the logical outcome of the unifying process initiated by the French Government. It would be the appropriate body for determining the European federal institution, and it must be set up without delay if the coal and steel Pool is not to be a failure and if the Conference for the unification of European Armed Forces is to be given the opportunity of making sound workable recommendations.

The Treaty for the convening of a European Federal Constituent Assembly will be signed by the States which are willing to accept the *principle* of a limitation of their sovereignty on a reciprocal basis.

In order to provide European Statesmen with a practical working document, a number of eminent jurists have drawn up—at the request of the European Union of Federalists—a Draft Statute for a European Constituent Assembly, the provisions of which were approved on 20th April 1951 by an international conference of jurists, leading politicians and federalists held at Lugano (see Appendix).

MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN FEDERAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Assembly must not be a diplomatic Conference of national delegates. In every conference of this kind, each country represents a self-contained unit, and ministers or Government delegates are bound to defend the interests of the country they represent—which means knocking the substance out of any proposal for the limitation of that country's sovereignty.

The Assembly which is to draft a new Statute for the peoples of Europe must represent the peoples themselves. As there is no time to be lost, the members of the Constituent Assembly would have to be elected by the parliaments—since they themselves represent the sovereign will of the people—instead of being elected by the people direct.

In any event, the various shades of democratic political opinion must be represented there, so that majorities may be built up on common ideals or interests and not according to tightly-drawn national groupings; only in this way will it be possible to overcome nationalist affinities in the newly-born European Parliament.

THE PACT OF FEDERAL UNION

Under its terms of reference, the European Constituent Assembly will have to determine the powers relating to foreign policy, defence and economic and budgetary policy that are to be transferred from the Federated States to the Federal Government. It will also have to provide for the establishment of the Federal Parliament, Government and Tribunal. Lastly, it must specify the number of ratifications required before the Pact may come into force.

THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION

Once the Pact has been drafted and approved, the Assembly will have completed its task. The Pact will then be referred to the States of free Europe for ratification.

Governments, parliaments and public opinion will not then be confronted with the kind of loose project which raises doubts and misgivings because no one is quite sure what it implies. The Pact of Federal Union will make clear to every one exactly what the individual States are forsaking, and what they and their peoples are receiving in exchange.

As soon as the required number of States have ratified the Pact, the federal institutions which it provides for will be set up; European Federation will then come into being and will remain open to those States that were not originally prepared to join it.

There are other ways of achieving the principal aim of every far-seeing statesman, which is the convening of a European Constituent Assembly. It is suggested in some quarters that the Political Assembly responsible for controlling the European Army should be instructed to draft the Federal Pact which is the obvious corollary of a European Army.

If this solution should be decided upon by the statesmen concerned, there is no reason to object to it, since it is simply another means of achieving the same purpose. Everything should be done, however, to ensure that the membership of this Assembly and its terms of reference be such as to enable it to carry out the great task entrusted to it.

Our preference lies, however, with the Lugano project, which is endorsed by no less an authority than General Eisenhower. In the course of an interview with a French journalist on 27th October, General Eisenhower said:

" Nothing could give us more pleasure than to hear that the countries of Western Europe had decided to call a meeting of accredited representatives in a European town — say Luxembourg — with instructions to draft the Articles of the European Constitution, to choose the capital of Europe, etc... and that from 1st January onwards, Western Europe was to work as a Federation. "

The proceedings of the European Constituent Assembly, however it may be formed, can be completed in a few months. The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 drew up the American Constitution in four months, and the German Constituent Assembly of 1948-49 took six months to draft a constitution for Western Germany. It should not take very much longer than this to ratify the Pact and set up federal institutions.

The European Federation could thus be brought into being in less time than is considered necessary by the experts for the organization of defence and the achievement of economic integration. Moreover—as explained in the foregoing paragraphs—it needs a Federal Government to organise defence and unify the European economy. To postpone the convening of a European Federal Constituent Assembly means wasting time which could be used to save Europe.

This is no longer the time for half-measures and for solving problems on paper. Europe is now at the cross-roads: on the one hand, a divided Europe, with its desperate attempts at agreement and cooperation, and the certain prospect of early disintegration, and, on the other, the convening of a European Federal Constituent Assembly to lay the foundations of the United States of Europe.

We have come to one of those rare moments in history when men must choose not only their own immediate fate, but that of generations still unborn.

APPENDIX

Draft Statute of the European Federal Constituent Assembly prepared by the INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE, amended and adopted by the INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LUGANO (Switzerland) — April 18-20, 1951. — International Legal Committee: Fernand Debousse, chairman (Belgium), Piero Calamandrei (Italy), Hans Nawiasky (Germany), Georges Scelle (France) and Altiero Spinelli, political rapporteur (Italy).

THE GOVERNMENTS OF...

DETERMINED to do everything in their power to safeguard and strengthen freedom, the Rights of Man, democracy, justice and social progress, the foundations of European civilisation, to-day in serious jeopardy;

CONVINCED that complete equality of rights and duties among the peoples and citizens of Europe can be achieved only in a European democratic federation which would bring to an end former harmful antagonisms; that the European specialized agencies existing or in process of formation can be developed, coordinated and made fully effective only under the direction and supervision of a federal government and parliament;

BELIEVING IN PARTICULAR that the defence of democratic Europe calls for the creation of an Authority endowed with the necessary political powers and finance immediately to set up and supervise a European armed force; that European unity is inconceivable without an international policy common to the various European States; that economic and social progress cannot be guaranteed and expanded unless the European political authority is given the power to integrate the various national economies;

PERSUADED that the initiative for European federal unification must be taken by them immediately, since it is their peoples who are most directly threatened by the consequences of the present serious division of Europe, but that this enterprise must remain open on a friendly basis to all other democratic European countries;

HAVE RESOLVED to convene immediately a European Federal Constituent Assembly for the purposes and with the composition set out in the present Statute.

I.—Convening of the European Federal Constituent Assembly

1. Within three months of the entry into force of the present Statute, the European Federal Constituent Assembly shall be convened with its seat at...
2. It shall be called upon to draw up and vote a Pact of Federal Union between all the participating States.

II.—Composition of the Assembly

1. The European Federal Constituent Assembly shall be composed of representatives of the participating States.
2. Each State shall have a number of representatives equal to twice the number of seats it holds in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. The representatives shall have the nationality of the State appointing them.

III.—Appointment of Representatives

1. The representatives of the European Federal Constituent Assembly shall be elected by the national parliaments in accordance with the procedure and in the conditions laid down by them.

2. While the Assembly is sitting, the representatives shall not be called upon by the Governments or by the Parliaments to fulfil any other function than that of member of the Assembly. Where necessary, they shall continue to fill the posts or functions held by them in their respective countries at the opening of the session.
3. The participating States undertake to appoint their representatives within two months of the entry into force of the present Statute.

IV.—Decisions of the Assembly

1. Decisions of the European Federal Constituent Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the representatives present and voting, except in the case of questions connected with the division of powers between the Federation and the Federated States, when the decision shall be taken by a double majority of the representatives present and voting and of the participating States, it being understood that the vote of a State shall be considered as gained when the vote of the majority of its representatives present and voting has itself been gained.
2. Any dispute concerning the application of the preceding paragraph shall be settled by a decision of the majority of representatives present and voting.

V.—Mandate of the Assembly

1. The European Federal Constituent Assembly shall continue in session until it has drawn up and voted the Pact of Federal Union.
2. The Pact shall determine the federal institutions required to safeguard and strengthen the security, freedom and welfare of the peoples of the European Federation. With that end in view, it shall specify the powers that are to be transferred to the Federation. There shall be no transfer of powers relating to the internal organisation of any State.
3. The Pact shall also lay down the organisation and the working of the federal institutions.
4. Between the federated States, there shall exist neither privilege nor difference of status.
5. The Pact shall establish standards guaranteeing the maintenance of existing relations between mother-countries and overseas territories. It shall stipulate that no change may be made in them without the consent of those concerned.
6. The Pact shall lay down the conditions and methods governing its own revision.

VI.—Entry into force of the present Statute

1. The present Statute shall be submitted by the signatory governments for approval to the competent constitutional authorities of each State.
2. The procedure shall begin immediately after the signature. It should be completed as rapidly as possible.
3. The Statute shall enter into force, between the States which have ratified it, as soon as the number of ratifications corresponds to one third at least of the total metropolitan population of the signatory States.
4. Thereafter, the Statute shall enter into force on the day each individual ratification is deposited.

5. The period laid down in Article I for the convening of the European Federal Constituent Assembly and in Article III for the appointment of representatives shall run from the day on which the conditions of paragraph 3 above have been fulfilled.
6. If ratifications are deposited after the expiry of one or all of these time-limits, this shall not deprive the States concerned of the right to send representatives to the Assembly. Questions already decided by the Assembly shall not be re-opened by the entry of new representatives, unless otherwise decided by an absolute majority of the members of the European Federal Constituent Assembly.

VII.—Adherence of other States

1. The present Statute shall be open to all non-signatory European States provided that they accept and apply the principle of democracy as the basis of their political organisation and respect the Rights of Man as the basis of democracy.
2. Upon its signature, the Statute shall be communicated to all States which at that time fulfil the above conditions.
3. The adherence of non-signatory States shall, in respect of ratification, carry with it the effects indicated in Article VI, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

VIII.—Organisation Committee

1. An Organisation Committee shall be set up to prepare for the meeting and work of the European Federal Constituent Assembly and in particular to draw up a draft of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.
2. This Committee shall meet at...
3. The Committee shall be composed of Commissioners appointed, one for each State, by the governments that have ratified or adhered to the present Statute.
4. It shall meet and begin work as soon as the conditions laid down in Article VI, paragraph 3, have been fulfilled.
5. Each of the contracting States hereby undertakes to place at the Committee's disposal the funds required to contribute to the expenses of the organisation in proportion to the number of its representatives.

IX.—Entry into Force of the Pact of Federal Union

1. On its adoption by the European Federal Constituent Assembly, the Pact of Federal Union shall be transmitted for approval, by the President of the Assembly, to the competent constitutional authorities of each State that took part in its preparation.
2. The final decision of the above-mentioned authorities shall be taken as rapidly as possible.
3. The Pact of Federal Union shall lay down the minimum number of ratifications necessary and sufficient to bring it into effect.
4. Thereafter, the Pact of Federal Union shall enter into force on the day its ratification is deposited by each individual State.
5. The Pact shall remain open to all the States of Europe that did not take part in its preparation, on condition that they accept and apply the principle of democracy as the basis of their political organisation and respect for the Rights of Man as the basis of democracy.
6. With that end in view, the Pact on its adoption shall be communicated by the President of the Assembly to all States that fulfil the above conditions.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION OF FEDERALISTS

BELGIUM: Hervé BRUHON, Jean BUCHMANN, Chairman of the Jeunesses Européennes Fédéralistes, Fernand DEHOUSSE, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Jean DE SPOT, Albert LOHEST, member of the Executive Bureau, Pierre LUCION, member of the Executive Bureau, Charles PLISNIER, Raymond RIFFLET.

DENMARK: Thomas Hatt OLSEN.

FRANCE: Robert BURON, Pierre de FELICE, Henri FRENAY, Chairman of the Executive Bureau, François GERARD, Claude-Marcel HYTTE, member of the Executive Bureau, Gaston KARILA, Robert MANGIN, Alexandre MARC, Jean-Maurice MARTIN, Edmond MICHELET, Pierre PASSANI, Germaine PEYROLES, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Gaston RIOU, André VOISIN, member of the Executive Bureau.

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC: Otto BLESSING, member of the Executive Bureau, Herbert KLEIN, Eugen KOGON, Chairman of the Central Committee, Dieter ROSER, Albert SCHINZINGER, member of the Executive Bureau, Max H. Von GUMPPENBERG.

GREAT-BRITAIN: Ota ADLER, Margaret DRU, Frances L. JOSEPHY, member of the Executive Bureau, Keith KILLBY.

ITALY: Anna ANFOSSI, Secretary General of the Jeunesses Européennes Fédéralistes, Celeste BASTIANETTO, Ludovico BENVENUTI, member of the Executive Bureau, Luciano BOLIS, Aldo GAROSCI, Enzo GIACCHERO, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Gustavo MALAN, Franco NOBILI, Altiero SPINELLI, Delegate General, Guglielmo USELLINI, Secretary General.

LUXEMBOURG: Arthur CALTEUX, member of the Executive Bureau.

NETHERLANDS: Henri BRUGMANS, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, Alfred MOZER, Henri NORD, member of the Executive Bureau, Cornelis VAN RIJ.

SAAR: Heinz BRAUN.

SWITZERLAND: Denis de ROUGEMONT, Ernst B. STEFFAN, Ernst Von SCHENCK, member of the Executive Bureau.

IN EXILE: Bulgaria: Milka CHENADIEFF, Spain: Xavier LANDA-BURU, Hungary: Antoine RADVANSZKY, Poland: François GURALCZYK, Georges LANGROD, Tadeus PARCZENSKI, Roumania: Gabriel BADARAU, Assistant Secretary General, Grégoire GAFENCO, Czechoslovakia: Jaroslav ZICH, Yugoslavia: Jla JUKITCH.